Company: Japan's first dedicated optical glass manufacturer (est. 1935). ~150 proprietary glass types, 90 years of melting & crystallization expertise. Two segments: Optical (camera lens glass, turnaround) and Electronics (semiconductor lithography glass + AI low-dielectric glass + quartz glass). Major shareholders: Seiko Group (40.9%), Canon (19.2%). Net cash: ¥9.3B (25% of MCap). P/B 0.67x — 33% below book value.
| Subsidiary | Location | Role | Est. Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ohara Quartz Co., Ltd. | Japan | Synthetic quartz glass (VAD method, SK-1300 Series) | ~¥5.3B |
| OPC Corporation | Japan | Ultra-precision planar polishing | Subsidiary |
| Taiwan Ohara Optical Material Co. | Taiwan | Low-dielectric glass for AI server PCBs | Growing |
| Ohara Optical (Zhongshan) Ltd. | China | Optical glass manufacturing | Optical |
| NHG-Ohara Optics (Xiangyang) Co. | China | JV for optical materials | JV |
| Ohara Optical (M) Sdn. Bhd. | Malaysia | Diversified manufacturing | Multi-product |
| Ohara GmbH | Germany | European sales & support | Sales |
| Ohara Corporation USA | USA | North American sales & support | Sales |
| Product | Segment | Application | Market Position | Est. Rev FY25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| i-line High Homogeneity Glass | Electronics | Semiconductor lithography lenses | Near-monopoly | ~¥4.5B |
| CLEARCERAM-Z | Electronics | Ultra-low expansion ceramics | Top 2 (vs Schott Zerodur) | ~¥2.0B |
| Low-Dielectric Glass | Electronics | AI server PCBs (data centers) | Niche (vs AGC, Corning) | ~¥3.5B |
| Quartz Glass (SK-1300) | Electronics | FPD exposure, photomasks | Smaller player | ~¥5.3B |
| LICGC | Electronics | Solid-state battery electrolyte | 27.7% global share | ~¥0.5B |
| NANOCERAM | Electronics | Smartphone casings | Niche (vs Gorilla Glass) | Early |
| Optical Press Molds | Optical | Molded aspherical lenses | #4 globally (10.9%) | ~¥12.5B |
| Optical Block Glass | Optical | Polished lens raw material | #4 globally | ~¥2.9B |
| Rank | Company | Share | Bar |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Schott AG (Germany) | 28.8% | |
| 2 | Hoya Optics (Japan) | 20.3% | |
| 3 | Corning Inc. (USA) | 16.0% | |
| 4 | Ohara Inc. (Japan) | 10.9% | |
| 5 | TOVA OPTECH | 9.9% | |
| 6 | Sumita Optical Glass (Japan) | 9.9% |
Source: QYResearch, MarketIntelo. Top 3 (Schott+Hoya+Corning) dominate ~65% of market.
Global i-line high homogeneity glass market valued at ~$2.2B in 2024, growing ~4% CAGR to $2.9B by 2030. Highly concentrated — Ohara, SCHOTT, AGC, Nikon, MEDEI Optics control >80% of the market. Ohara has a near-monopoly in i-line exposure equipment glass (Toyo Keizai Shikiho, 2023). Semiconductor lithography = ~70% of i-line glass demand ($327M). Refractive index tolerance of ±1–2×10⁻⁵ creates an extreme barrier to entry.
Global Ceramics Solid Electrolyte (2025)
| Type | Value | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Sulfide-based | $209.8M | 54.4% |
| Oxide-based (LICGC) | $145.5M | 37.8% |
| Phosphate-based | $30.2M | 7.8% |
| Total | $385.5M | 100% |
LICGC Market Share
| Company | Share |
|---|---|
| Ohara Inc. | 27.7% |
| AGC Inc. | 18.7% |
| SCHOTT AG | 15.5% |
| Ishizuka Glass Co. | 11.1% |
| Tosoh Corporation | 9.2% |
Source: DataInsights Market Research
| Item (¥M) | FY2024 Act | FY2025 Act | FY2026E | YoY 24→25 | YoY 25→26E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales | 27,909 | 28,895 | 31,900 | +3.5% | +10.4% |
| Cost of Sales | ~19,220 | ~19,826 | ~22,900 | +3.2% | +15.5% |
| Gross Profit | ~8,689 | ~9,069 | ~9,000 | +4.4% | −0.8% |
| Gross Margin | ~31.1% | ~31.4% | ~28.2% | +0.3pp | −3.2pp |
| SG&A | ~6,512 | ~7,275 | ~7,200 | +11.7% | −1.0% |
| Operating Profit | 2,177 | 1,794 | 1,800 | −17.6% | +0.3% |
| OP Margin | 7.8% | 6.2% | 5.6% | −1.6pp | −0.6pp |
| Ordinary Profit | 2,587 | 2,289 | 2,200 | −11.5% | −3.9% |
| Net Profit (Parent) | 1,568 | 1,730 | 1,400 | +10.3% | −19.1% |
| Net Margin | 5.6% | 6.0% | 4.4% | +0.4pp | −1.6pp |
| EPS (¥) | 64.36 | 71.04 | 58.79 | +10.4% | −17.2% |
| Dividend (¥) | 23.00 | 25.00 | 25.00 | +8.7% | Flat |
⚠ Structural Risk: Electronics contributes 122% of total segment OP. If Electronics OP dropped to zero, the consolidated entity would be loss-making at −¥400M.
| Scenario | P/E | Price | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | ×15 | ¥882 | −40% |
| Market | ×20 | ¥1,176 | −20% |
| Current | ×25 | ¥1,470 | 0% |
| Target | ×28 | ¥1,640 | +11.6% |
| Bull | ×33 | ¥1,940 | +32% |
H2 OP ¥1,267M needed (70% of year = 2.4× H1). Delivery confirms Electronics recovery. Guidance raised +12.5% in June 2026.
H1 −¥168M (annualized −¥336M vs guide −¥400M) suggests breakeven possible FY2027. Announcement = powerful sentiment catalyst.
SEMI/WSTS equipment billings. Canon lithography shipments. i-line tool demand recovery directly validates Electronics thesis.
Capital allocation priorities expected. Buyback continuation or dividend hike vs Electronics growth capex.
Customer win for waveguide-compatible glass opens new Optical growth narrative beyond cameras.
Seiko 40.9% + Canon 19.2% + Treasury 6.7% = 67% concentrated. Free float ~27%. FY2025: ¥897M cross-shareholding reduction gain.
Electronics = 122% of total OP. If margins fall below 14% or semi cycle delays, consolidated profitability swings sharply lower. Optical cannot compensate.
High-margin lithography glass (21%) → lower-margin AI PCB glass (14%). If permanent, structural OP could settle at 12-14% — ~35% earnings reduction vs FY2024.
China controls ~90% of global rare earth refining. Costs ~¥40M/year. Supply disruption would severely impact Optical turnaround.
CDGM offers 200+ glass types at lower cost. Mgmt: 'Chinese peers acquiring our capabilities at tremendous speed.'
FY26E implies H2 OP ¥1,267M = 2.4× H1. FY25 H2 was ¥743M. The steepest sequential recovery in 3 years.
Defense surtax Apr 2026 (+0.9pp to 31.5%) pressures net profit. Energy costs volatile.
Revenue +9.6% but gross profit −9.5% → gross margin 31.9% → 26.3% (−5.6pp). COGS surged +18.6%, far outpacing revenue. Dual cause: product mix deterioration + raw material inflation + China VAT refund elimination.
Prolonged semi inventory adjustment + SG&A +11.7% vs Rev +3.5%.
High-margin i-line/CLEARCERAM declining; lower-margin AI PCB glass replacing.
Revenue growth through lower-margin products. Without ¥677M buyback, EPS even lower.
Loss −¥800M→−¥400M. Price revisions + mirrorless demand. Breakeven visible FY2027.